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Shiny Things and Sovereign Legalities: Expropriation of Dynastic Property in the 
Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic 
 
In December 1909, a recently manumitted concubine named Layık Seza 
petitioned the office of the Grand Vizier to claim a piano she had left behind at Yıldız 
Palace, where she was expelled following Abdülhamid II’s deposal earlier that year.1 
Like many others before her, Layık Seza was brought to the imperial palace as a young 
girl, where she built her world around things she earned for the “good deeds” she had 
done for the benefit of the Ottoman state. On the one hand, she well knew that nothing 
she had was hers to own. The property of the enslaved members of the Ottoman court 
was ordinarily confiscated, not only upon their death but in the event of a sultan’s deposal 
as well.2 On the other hand, however, she also knew that she could claim the piano only 
as her personal property. “For they gave back our personal items,” she explained with 
studied naivety in her petition, “but they [must] have forgotten to return my mahogany 
colored piano.”3 She intuitively grasped that, as the Ottoman Empire moved from one 
mode of rule to another, from absolute to constitutional monarchy, layers of meanings 
that the piano previously held in relation to sovereign power collapsed into one: it 
became the personal and private property of —and, had to be claimed as such by— a 
person who herself had been the property of the Ottoman state until recently. 
Layık Seza’s personal campaign to recover her piano exemplified many features 
of the rupture and subsequent ambiguity of ownership of dynastic property caused by the 
1908 constitutional revolution in the Ottoman Empire. The revolution brought new 
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limitations and significance to the physical and public presence of the Ottoman state 
embodied in the buildings and “things” that had hitherto been the symbols of imperial 
dominion and prerogative.4 To be sure, both the material presence of the Ottoman state 
and the complicated ownership systems of the sovereign’s property had already been in 
flux in the previous centuries.5 Concomitant with the global preoccupation with the 
setting of “universal standards for the holding of property” on the one hand and the 
parallel development of the liberal project of res publica on the other, the relationship of 
the modernizing Ottoman state to the material space continued to transform significantly 
throughout the nineteenth century.6  
This transformation was further intensified, with a touch of ambivalence, during 
the reign of Abdülhamid II, whose welfare policies helped to expand the public domain 
through increasing number of public works and institutions. On the flipside, however, 
Abdülhamid II extensively exploited this expanding domain through a set of invented 
traditions that aimed to restore the sacredness of the sultan’s person,7 effecting a 
ceremonial and material presence of the state reminiscent of earlier times.8 It was in this 
context that the “sanctum” of his rule, Yıldız Palace, assumed a particular significance.9 
It was also in this context that, in the aftermath of his deposal in 1909, Yıldız Palace was 
singled out as a “monument of despotism” by the constitutional regime, whose 
subsequent desire to legitimately expropriate it brought about the first immediate 
challenges of determining the jurisdictional limits of public ownership of property and 
coming to terms with the question of what it meant for the “the people” to own 
“things.”10 
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Focusing roughly on the two decades that spanned from Abdülhamid II’s deposal 
in 1909 to the few years that followed the abolition of Caliphate in 1924, this article 
probes the legislative process of the expropriation of dynastic property by the late 
Ottoman and early Turkish Republican states at a time when their milieu of jurisdiction 
shifted significantly. It takes lengthy—and often utterly confused—parliamentary debates 
as entry points for exploring the nature of this expropriation process as a means to 
redefine sovereignty and the sovereign’s relationship with property on the one hand and 
to discursively create “political legitimacy and popular consent,” on the other.11 To be 
sure, this was a gradual process that hardly extended to other imperial buildings and 
things than Yıldız Palace at the time. Nonetheless, as this article aims to show, the initial 
debates and the subsequent expropriation of Yıldız Palace helped, heuristically, shaping a 
new understanding of public ownership of property that was put into use in other 
instances in the years to come, most notably during and after the First World War and the 
Armenian genocide, before establishing itself as the foundation of a new property regime 
with the republican appropriation and reuse two decades later. 
Historians of the late Ottoman Empire studied the state (trans)formation in this 
period extensively yet often treated, as Nadir Özbek aptly criticized, the Ottoman and the 
Republican states as “supreme and ever-present political actor[s],” which rarely appeared 
in doubt as to their limits.12 Recently, highly innovative work has been undertaken by the 
scholars of Greek and Bulgarian expulsions, the Armenian genocide, and the concomitant 
property confiscations and expropriations in the post-genocide Ottoman Empire.13 These 
studies have effectively demonstrated that it was this intensive confiscation and 
destruction process that helped the Ottoman and early Republican governments to 
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consolidate their power, not only economically but also ideologically.14 It was also during 
this process that the legal and extralegal foundations of this new understanding of public 
ownership, and its intrinsic ties to national wealth and economy, were established. 
However, they too inevitably treat the Ottoman and Republican states as “concrete 
political bod[ies] and unified public actor[s]” that deployed their sovereign will to 
constitute exceptions and cause the destruction of those they set aside as the “accursed 
people.”15 
While the expropriation of dynastic and non-Muslim property paralleled each 
other and were intimately linked,16 the two processes also display some useful 
differences. For one, although there was ample ambiguity inherent in drafting and 
implementing laws on abandoned Greek or Armenian property,17 the overt hesitation and 
confusion in regards to the dynastic property, which loomed large in all parliamentary 
sessions, surpassed the former. This stemmed from distinct problems that were directly 
linked to the nature of dynastic property, which had to do with the classic, convoluted 
relationship of the person of the sovereign to the legal realm, particularly in regards to 
property ownership. Islamic jurisprudence and the accompanying administrative 
regulations had traditionally distinguished the private treasury of the sovereign (bayt māl 
al-khāṣṣa) from the fiscus or public treasury (bayt māl al-muslimīn), but the line between 
the two was by no means clear-cut.18 For the constitutional government, legal 
categorization of Abdülhamid II’s property after his deposal proved to be challenging, to 
say the least. Moreover, it was anything but a simple task to determine the limits of the 
person of the deposed sovereign, and sever him from the remainder of the Ottoman 
dynasty.  
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Secondly, both the Constitutional and the Republican governments used the 
imperial buildings and the “shiny things” they contained as beacons of the imagined 
majesty of the Ottoman Empire, which uncomfortably sat side by side with what came to 
be increasingly perceived as its undesirable past; first, against the Hamidian past and 
second, the Ottoman past as a whole. In what follows, this article traces the ways in 
which the Constitutional and Republican governments tried to tackle or circumvent these 
problems, with the overarching goal of understanding how the accompanying 
discordances, misconceptions, and ambiguities shaped the meanings of and the 
relationship between the state, the public domain, and property ownership in the late 
Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic. 
 
The Problem of Dynastic Property in the Constitutional Order 
Often portrayed as a watershed moment in the late Ottoman historiography, the 
1908 constitutional revolution was, in effect, no more than a “triumphant” reinstatement 
of an earlier, disrupted constitutional regime.19 Although carried out largely by military 
personnel, the revolution did not necessarily have a military character at the beginning. 
Nor did it bring an end to Abdülhamid II’s rule, even though the revolutionaries defined 
their oppositional politics often explicitly in reference to the heavy-handed rule of the 
former. What constituted more of a rupture than the 1908 revolution was the counter-
revolution that broke out in mid-April the following year. Ambiguously viewed by the 
historians at once as Abdülhamid’s attempt to regain power, the Liberal opposition’s 
provocation, and the Committee of Union and Progress’s (CUP) plot to take hold of the 
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central power militarily,20 the government’s crushing reaction to the counter-revolution 
achieved what the revolution did or could not earlier. During the nine days that it lasted, 
the “revolutionary fervor” that was nonexistent in the first phase of the revolution helped 
the CUP government do away with the governmental “impotence,” for which it had 
heretofore been firmly criticized.21 As a result, the violent suppression of the counter-
revolution by the government-organized Action Army not only effectively brought an 
end to the absolutist rule in the Ottoman Empire but also conspicuously militarized the 
political sphere.22 
It was also this “fervent” revolutionary moment that marked the beginning of the 
dissolution of the imperial palace, in this case primarily Yıldız Palace, as a political 
institution.23 Accordingly, the first parliamentary debates on the ownership of imperial 
property and its public and private character took place immediately after the 
disturbances were brought to an end. In the ensuing months, the parliamentarians debated 
legitimate ways of handling Yıldız Palace and things that it contained, with the aim of 
sketching a legal framework for the undertaking and determining the liabilities of the 
institutions that would carry out the process, including the liabilities and responsibilities 
of the legislature itself. 
The first official proposal on the issue was opened to deliberation shortly after the 
parliament reconvened on 1 May 1909, which suggested that a parliamentary commission 
be drawn up and accompany the inspectors employed by the Istanbul Municipality 
(Şehremaneti), the institution authorized to carry out the inspection and assessment of the 
Yıldız Palace buildings and its contents.24 While a general procedural ambiguity 
predominated in the sessions thereupon, several deputies readily agreed on their objection 
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to the Istanbul Municipality’s involvement in the matter, partly because the legitimacy 
and the necessity of the institution had begun to be contested also around this time.25 For 
one, the Sinop deputy Hasan Fehmi Efendi maintained that overseeing this process was 
the responsibility of the central government, particularly that of the Ministry of Finance 
and should not be left to the Municipality at all.26 Siroz (Sérres in today’s Greece) deputy 
Hiristo Dalçef Efendi also objected to the Istanbul Municipality’s primary involvement in 
the process, contending that the wealth housed in and extracted from Yıldız Palace did 
not belong to the imperial capital alone, but to the entire “nation.”27 Other deputies were 
concerned more specifically about the legal dimensions of the process. For Antalya 
deputy Ebüzziya Tevfik Bey, who was known to be less than an ardent supporter of the 
constitutional order, the Ottoman law commended that all this wealth to be transferred to 
the new sultan, and no government institution had the right to inspect or confiscate any of 
it.28 For Nafi Pasha, a deputy from Aleppo on the other hand, treasures of Yıldız should 
be considered beytü’l mal, the inspection of which was primarily a matter of the sharī’a 
law, to be supervised by the office of the şeyḫülislām (shaykh al-Islām, chief religious 
official in the Ottoman Empire, one that oversaw the Islamic sharī’a legal order, as 
well);29 a claim that was taken up by another Aleppan, Ali Cenani, the following day, 
who defined Abdülhamid II’s wealth and property as “extorted” from the people during 
the “era of despotism,” and could and should be taken back by “the people” precisely 
because it was beytü’l mal.30 
In the following months, deputies continued to bring in and negotiate their 
understanding of what public property meant and how they, as the presumed 
representatives of the people, were to handle it. All in all, neither the legislature nor the 
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executive branch of the government had a clear idea on the legal procedure as to how 
Yıldız Palace and the property found in it would be handled, and often more than one 
legal and administrative body was deemed entitled to supervise this process. In the 
meantime, however, the commander of both the Third Army Corps and the Action Army 
Mahmud Şevket Pasha sent telegrams to the parliament to report that all cash and a 
portion of the valuable items found at Yıldız Palace had already been seized and removed 
by the army and secured at their headquarters.31 In these telegrams, Mahmud Şevket 
Pasha stated, with utmost authority, that the parliament should not intervene in the 
process, as divan-ı harbi örfî (court martial during the declared state of emergency) 
regarded this a necessary measure, although their participation by sending “two or three 
individuals” to observe it was deemed appropriate.32 In that, while the government 
grappled with the jurisdictional limits and definitions of deposal and dissolution, 
revolutionary fervor had already placed its mark on the process and made it essentially 
militaristic in nature. 
The more critical questions came when the actual sorting and assessment process 
began. What exactly was subject to the proposed and subsequently carried out inspection 
and confiscation? Did it apply only to cash and valuable items, such as jewelry, or did it 
also include title deeds, equity shares and bonds that the deposed sultan kept in the 
banks? Was it only sultan Abdülhamid II’s personal wealth and if so, where did his 
‘person’ really end? As had been recurrently voiced in the subsequent debates, no 
justification was necessary for the proposed confiscation of Abdülhamid II’s personal 
property, as all of it was considered to have been acquired through illegitimate means.33 
The case for his extended family, on the other hand, which technically included his 
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brother, the reigning sultan Mehmed V Reşad, was different and more difficult to 
determine. Despite the recent constitutional amendments that brought limitations to the 
sultan’s executive and legislative powers,34 Mehmed V Reşad was still the legitimate 
ruler of the empire and the owner of the dynastic property. Thus, careful definition and 
excision of Abdülhamid II’s personal wealth from the remainder of the dynastic wealth 
was a difficult but a necessary task. 
The initial measures, to that effect, were no more than a set of spontaneous 
decisions to confiscate all movable and real property that belonged to Abdülhamid II and 
his immediate family. Accordingly, in a proposal, which was opened to deliberation on 
the 4 May 1909 sitting, the Commission on Budgetary Balance (Muvazene Encümeni) 
suggested that all wealth owned by Abdülhamid II and his family, including cash, stocks 
and bonds held in foreign institutions, be seized.35 Fearing that his family members 
would transfer money and valuable items (which at this time were already referred to as 
“the people’s” property (milletin malı)) outside the country, the commission also deemed 
it necessary to obtain restrictive orders for all corresponding bank accounts and bring 
strict control on the movement of all family members,36 a fear that proved well-founded 
when şehzade Burhaneddin Efendi, one of Abdülhamid II’s sons, was captured while 
trying to flee Istanbul two weeks later, carrying with him 20,000 lira worth of cash and 
checks.37 The government consequently arrived at the decision that Abdülhamid II’s 
personal property alone was to be confiscated and an official note from the office of the 
Grand Vizier established that everything he purchased, appropriated, and extorted both 
before and after he was enthroned in 1876 was subject to this confiscation.38 In other 
words, the constitutional government determined not only where the person of the 
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deposed sovereign ended but also how far back in time it extended. However, they still 
needed to locate this wealth in place, which posed another challenge in an already 
exceedingly globalized financial world. 
Were this solely a domestic issue, it would be an easy matter, Ahmed Bey, the 
acting president of the Commission on Budgetary Balance maintained. But the dethroned 
sultan spread his wealth virtually to all over the globe.39 Reclaiming the “things” held in 
those accounts in the name of the people (millet) was not a simple, if at all a possible 
task. As the deputies collectively noted, the foreign banks would be very unlikely to 
return the money, bonds and stocks they held on a simple request. The matter had to be 
reviewed in reference to the law (kanun dairesinde) and an official consultation needed to 
be communicated to the executive branch. But what did the law prescribe on this 
procedure exactly? The question was raised rather dispiritedly by the Istanbul deputy 
Hallacyan Efendi, to which the Üsküp (Skopje, in today’s Macedonia) deputy bluntly 
responded: “Nothing.”40 But surely the international law, implied to have the upper hand 
in matters related to “haute finance,” must have dealt with similar cases before, 
Hallacyan Efendi maintained, which they also could refer to. In the year that followed, 
the despairing and occasionally dumbfounded government embarked upon the process of 
collecting back Abdülhamid II’s money, bonds or stocks.41 Some of these collection 
processes were rather straightforward and were brought to a conclusion within a few 
months,42 while others, such as the ones with the Crédit Lyonnais or Reichsbank, the 
processes were remarkably complicated and took much longer time to resolve.43 All in 
all, regardless of their straightforwardness or complexity, these cases helped the 
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constitutional government to come to terms with the broader, international limits of their 
(re)envisioned sovereignty.  
Together with the valuable items found at Yıldız Palace and other wealth 
confiscated through domestic channels, all was transferred to the Ministry of Finance, 
though not without another round of confused debates among the parliamentarians, that 
brings us back to the initial question, posed above in the introduction, with which this 
article concerns itself. What were the limits of the Ottoman state’s ownership of these 
newly acquired funds? Or, to repeat the earlier question and put in more familiar terms, 
what did it mean for “the people” to own “things”?  
What the government could and could not do with the confiscated money was 
first discussed shortly after the deposal of Abdülhamid II, over a formal inquiry by the 
Commission for Hejaz Railway (Hicaz Demiryolu Encümeni). According to the note sent 
by the Commission’s president Abdülkadir Hâşimî, the deposed sultan had previously 
conceded 50,000 liras for the construction and maintenance of the railway, although the 
money was never received by the Commission.44  Continuing with the railway 
construction without any disruption was of utmost public importance, Abdülkadir Hâşimî 
contended, but also reliant on the availability of funds. It was thus that the Commission 
queried whether this amount could be set aside from the cash and valuables found at 
Yıldız Palace and at once deposited for the use of the Railway administration.45 This 
inquiry sparked a debate among the parliamentarians, some of whom were not even sure 
whether the amount in question was to be considered a gift or a debt. In either case, the 
main point of disagreement had to do with the nature and the definition of people’s 
property (milletin malı). As the Sinop deputy Hasan Fehmi Efendi confirmed, the 
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political, economic and religious importance and urgency of the Hejaz Railway could not 
be disputed, but the money found at Yıldız Palace belonged to the people (millet), who 
now seized and claimed it and could use it only in ways it pleased (keyfema yeşa’).46  
In addition to such large-scale projects, there were appeals for smaller and less 
valuable—though, no less important or urgent—resources particularly for the reusable 
items found at Yıldız Palace’s residential quarters. One such request was for the transfer 
of Yıldız Palace’s bedframes and copperware to the soon to be opened hospital in 
Cerrahpaşa.47 Informed about these items, stacked up and idly waiting at the palace, the 
Directorate General for Health and Public Assistance (Müessesât-ı Hayriye-i Sıhhiye 
Riyaseti) requested them for the hospital’s use from the Municipal Government, who, in 
its turn asked the Ministry of Interior for their transfer. Similar to the large public 
projects, these requests also brought forth debates around the problem of “the people’s” 
ownership of “things” and called for a legal definition and procedure, as well as a 
justification for the things’ appropriation for public use. The items that were included in 
the Directorate General’s list comprised no more than a few iron bedframes, copper pots 
and pans and straw matrasses, which held close to no value. Moreover, as the deputy 
mayor Tevfik Bey stated in support, they were left there unused, “to rust and decay 
whereas they could be of utmost use, serving the sick people of the city instead.”48 The 
Municipal Government was short of funds, the deputy mayor further explained, and the 
hospital had urgency, thus despite having no value these items would ease the financial 
burden of the former.49 Even with such reasoning, however, the Ministry of Interior 
found this request unacceptable, until the Grand Vizier Hakkı Pasha’s involvement and 
the new sultan’s approval of their transfer.50  
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The valuable items found at Yıldız Palace, particularly jewelry, were 
consequently priced in accordance with expert assessments and reluctantly auctioned, 
bringing the state treasury a decent sum in the end.51 Less valuable items, which had 
potential public use, continued to slowly and cautiously flow towards the public 
institutions, both old and new. One such case was debated at the parliament within the 
larger context of budgetary planning, when the deputies voted in favor of transferring 
various tools and instruments in Yıldız Palace’s observatory to a newly established 
meteorological station.52 Many other items were given away to a range of government 
institutions, most notably the Ministry of Education, to be utilized in schools.53 The 
palace automobiles were requested by the Ministry of War.54 
Once Abdülhamid’s things were duly transposed, the focus of the debates shifted 
towards the built environment of Yıldız Palace itself, confiscation of which was more 
conspicuous than auctioning jewelry or disposing cash and had to be conceived publicly, 
with due precision and utmost legitimacy. From early on after Abdülhamid’s deposal, 
there were suggestions to turn Yıldız Palace into a museum that would represent the 
struggle of “the people” against its “infamous resident.” There were also other 
suggestions based on the immediate needs of “the people,” and by extension, for the 
public good in general. Sinop deputy Hasan Fehmi Efendi, for one, suggested that the 
palace be given to the least funded of all Ottoman institutions; namely, the state 
almshouse (Darülaceze).55  
In effect, the discourse on the needs and necessities of the “people” defined the 
contours of the ways in which Yıldız Palace was put into use in the subsequent months. 
The palace gardens and part of the buildings were opened to public visits shortly after 
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Abdülhamid II’s deposal, allowing both Ottoman and foreign visitors to take guided or 
unguided tours.56 While the newspapers boasted a commercial return of 100 liras daily, 
the Yıldız Commission’s efforts focused on the palace’s public uses, determining along 
the way, what public use or benefit came to mean in general.57 For one, the Yıldız 
Commission used the palace grounds to organize social gatherings with appearances by 
the members of the Ottoman dynasty, with the purpose of raising money for the victims 
of anti-Armenian pogroms that had taken place in Adana several weeks earlier.58  
There were other instances, however, in which the use of the palace buildings 
were more ideologically charged. Such was the case when the Committee of Union and 
Progress decided to hold a banquet at Yıldız Palace for the occasion of the first year 
anniversary of the revolution.59 In that, the handling of the palace grounds was not wholly 
untouched by the ideological effects of the regime change, but even so it was presented 
more as an act of retribution that aimed at “doing justice” on behalf of the people. Full 
ideologization of the expropriation process would take years of legislative work that 
regulated total mobilization, genocide, confiscation, destruction and appropriation, at the 
end of which the Turkish Republic emerged as the lawful owner of the whole of dynastic 
things.  
 
 
Wartime Appropriation and Republican Reuse 
As the dissolution of Yıldız Palace was still underway in early 1910, a low-
ranking gendarmerie officer, who had been on duty in the makeshift station there, 
 15 
reportedly removed furniture from the palace with the purpose of furnishing a nearby 
gendarme station.60 Related correspondences between the Ministry of the Interior, the 
office of the Grand Vizier, and the Municipal Government all stated the unlawfulness of 
the items’ transfer, which the officer carried out despite the fact that he was repeatedly 
advised against it.61 While the War Ministry’s response is missing from the file, the 
continued correspondences indicate that those items were never returned to the palace 
premises. Unlike the Directorate General’s request for the Cerrahpaşa Hospital, the 
Gendarmerie division did not have to make a case for itself, nor do they seem to have 
obtained the sultan’s permission for the items’ transfer. As indicated by Mahmud Şevket 
Pasha’s commanding voice when he gave the ultimatum to the parliament a year earlier 
or the easiness with which the War Ministry claimed and obtained the palace automobiles 
a few months earlier, the army had the upper hand in the expropriation process.62 While 
the Ottoman Parliament often appeared to be in full support of it, particularly in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1909 counter-revolution, the actions of the military personnel 
did not always go unnoticed or uncontested. On the contrary, deputies openly voiced their 
criticism of the anomalous position held by the military in general and by Mahmud 
Şevket Pasha in particular.63  
This situation changed drastically with the onset of the Balkan Wars that marked 
the beginning of what would be the final decade of the Ottoman Empire. Throughout this 
period of consecutive wars, total mobilization, and harsh suppression of all political 
opposition, the Ottoman state claimed its citizens’ lives and property in its entirety, 
leaving only few facets of the Ottoman society untouched.64 To be sure, the Ottoman 
state had claimed the property of its subjects and citizens before the Balkan Wars as well. 
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For one, it had customarily confiscated land and moveable property through the 
governmental practice of müsadere all throughout its existence. Yet, this practice 
targeted, at least in theory, the office and/or local power holders65 and rarely, if at all, 
translated into a wholesale dispossession.66 For instance, in the case of the abolition of 
the Janissary corps and the associated Bektashi sufi order, extensive confiscations were 
still limited to regimental property or that of the individuals prosecuted during or 
following the abolition.67  
What is more important and relevant, perhaps, is that a number of legal 
“inventions,” such as those related to the newly emerging welfare policies in the 
nineteenth century transformed the existing sharī’a provisions, gave an unprecedented 
license to the Ottoman state to intervene directly in the matters of personal and family 
property and act in the interest of the Ottoman poor and needy.68 In 1873, for instance, 
the Ottoman state reportedly expropriated numerous houses and plots that belonged to a 
private waqf in Edirne, in support of the newly built state orphanage there.69 A good 
portion of these policies and concomitant legal changes were effected also by large-scale 
population displacements that began in the mid-nineteenth century,70 during which such 
categories as abandoned property in particular began to assume new meanings, ones that 
could be fairly different from classical provisions on the subject.71 In that, not only the 
standards for the holding of property, but also the very definition of sovereignty and its 
relationship to both “the people” and “things” transformed in the second half of the 
nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth centuries.  
This transformation intensified in the final decade of the empire and, beginning 
with the implementation of the war taxes (tekalif-i harbiye) during the Balkan Wars, 
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culminated in a series of laws that ordered the systematic confiscation of property for 
military purposes.72 More decisive than the military requisitioning in this context, 
however, was the coinciding process of large-scale dispossession of Bulgarians, Greeks, 
and later on Armenians during and after the World War I and the reformulated notion of 
abandoned property (emval-i metruke), which emerged as its immediate outcome. As 
already mentioned, the legal category of abandoned property, which had historically been 
one of the subsidiary income sources that constituted beytü’l mal,73 was not a new 
invention. Already in flux earlier in the nineteenth century, however, it assumed a whole 
new significance with the onset of the Bulgarian and Greek expulsion in 1913 and 
particularly throughout the Armenian genocide, and became the central concern of the 
subsequent governments, both economically and ideologically, in their efforts to redefine 
who the sovereign was and how it related to the holding of property.74  
As with the constitutional government’s take over of the dynastic property a few 
years earlier, the central question in relation to the appropriation of “abandoned” non-
Muslim property was that of legitimacy.75 While this process began during the Balkan 
Wars, the first law that regulated the confiscation of abandoned property, albeit a 
temporary one, did not come until September 1915.76 Generically entitled “the law about 
the abandoned properties, debts and credits of the population who were transferred to 
other locales,” the decree stipulated that all real property be registered by the treasury of 
the Ministry of Finance, whereas all moveable property had to be gathered and assessed 
by a commission, to be duly auctioned and sold.77 The corresponding money would then 
be given to the local subdivisions of the Treasury, to be eventually returned to the actual 
owner of the items, a stipulation that was fully overridden by laws enacted at different 
 18 
times, that gradually transferred all of the property to the state budget of the Turkish 
Republic following the War of Independence.78 Still however, this process was not self-
evident, nor straightforward. For one, it took years of lengthy, and once again utterly 
confused, parliamentary debates to resolve the categorical messiness inherent in the new 
definitions of abandoned property, which treated all absentee property owners—whether 
fugitive, disappeared, or even killed— as one and the same.79 Such concepts as legal 
heirs or proxies vis-à-vis abandoned property also took lengthy efforts to resolve,80 as the 
subsequent governments strove to attain legitimate means for “the people’s” ownership 
of “things.”  
The novelty of the War of Independence was that it fomented, among other things 
a radical redefinition of property ownership that was strictly along national lines. By the 
end of the war, the question of property, particularly of public property, was no longer 
solely about the legitimate ownership of “things” by a body referred to indistinctly as 
“the people,” as was the case during the appropriation of Yıldız Palace or even during the 
early phases of Armenian genocide.81 Instead, it has become a question of, as Ellinor 
Morack has eloquently shown, “who the nation was, whether or not it could be 
represented, and if yes, by whom;”82 a question that went on to inform the legislative 
processes in the aftermath of the war, not only on the continued appropriation of 
abandoned property but also the impending abolition of caliphate and the expropriation of 
dynastic property which it was intimately linked with. For one, the earlier discussions on 
the appropriation of Yıldız Palace depicted Abdülhamid II primarily as an unjust ruler 
who amassed his property through illegitimate means. The new debates on the abolition 
of the caliphate and the implied expropriation of dynastic property, on the other hand, 
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were informed by and paralleled this increasingly more radicalized discourse on who the 
nation was83 and sought to define Abdülmecid II and other members of the dynastic 
family principally as undeserving citizens.84  
After lengthy deliberations over the years, and not without ample reservation,85 
the “Law on the abolition of Caliphate and exile of the dynasty members” passed on 3 
March 1924.86 As the title indicates, it not only abrogated the office of the Caliph but also 
ordered all members of the dynasty to leave the country at once. The reasoning, with 
which the bill of law was introduced, was rather straightforward: the existence of the 
office and the imminent threat that it posed undermined the efforts of the Republican 
state in establishing itself as sovereign, and potentially had destructive effects on the 
future of the new political order.87 Signed and presented by the president of the 
Commission on Standing Orders (Nizamname-i Dahilî Encümeni) and 53 other deputies, 
the thirteen-item bill touched upon all presumed complications resulting from the 
abolition and expulsion. Six of these items were about the regulations and management of 
dynastic property alone.88  
Shortly before the law was brought to the parliament, the problem of dynasty was 
raised during the budgetary discussions in a slightly different, yet more poignant way. 
When it was disclosed that the first Republican governmental budget contained a hefty 
sum set aside for the use of the dynastic family, Istanbul deputy Yusuf Akçura Bey led 
the way in offering heavy criticism.89 In no republican order existed a noble class that 
constituted a dynasty, Akçura noted. The bylaws of the ruling Republican People’s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası) also made it clear by its second clause: its members, largely 
the Republican government, were obliged to do away with the privileges granted to “any 
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family, class, congregation or individual.”90 For Akçura and many others who concurred 
with him, the budget set aside for or allowances paid to the caliph or the other members 
of the Ottoman dynasty were essentially incompatible with the very definition of the 
republic itself. Denizli deputy Mazhar Müfit Bey took the discussion even further in the 
following session: the dynasty had no share in the national budget because only those 
who could make justified citizenship rights claims could have a share in it. The dynastic 
family, with all the “shine” Mazhar Müfit Bey specified, was neither. Nor were they on 
any sort of duty on behalf of “the people.”91  
This intrinsic contradiction of dynastic presence in the republican order was dealt 
with, in no less contradictory manner, in the first clause of the Law on the abolition of 
Caliphate, enacted a week later. The law unambiguously stipulated that 1) each and every 
member of the Ottoman dynasty was now stripped indefinitely of their—largely 
inexistent—citizenship and rights to reside within the borders of the Turkish Republic, 
which they had to leave within ten days; 2) no member of the dynasty could own real 
property in the country and whatever property they owned had to be liquidated within a 
year and following a particular legal procedure; 3) all land titles that belonged to the 
dynasty, as well as all moveable property found at the palaces and other imperial 
buildings, such as furniture, jewelry, paintings and other types of art works were now 
transferred to “the people,” understood as the nation (millete intikal etmiştir).92  
Specified for most part as excessive pomp, and supported by the contemporary 
press as such, the lengthy discussion that followed the introduction of the bill at the 
parliament drew clear connections between the excessive splendor that was still existent 
in the palaces and both the excessive poverty and “backwardness” of “the people.”93 
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Highly supportive of the Republican government’s recent resolution, and mirroring for 
most part the parliamentary debates, the newspapers and journals went as far as calling 
the Ottoman dynasty as the parasitic class (tufeyli sınıf) to highlight its incompatibility 
with the republican order.94 Six items of the proposed law, which were directly related to 
the issue of dynastic property, were accepted without any debate or discussion, let alone 
contestation.95 
Despite it being unambiguous and that it was accepted almost unanimously, the 
law brought about a whole new range of complications, which were reminiscent of the 
difficulties that the preceding governments had grappled with in the previous decade and 
a half. Stuck with a large number of buildings and things in its possession, the republican 
government faced the challenge of putting these items into reuse in safe and meaningful 
ways for public good or benefit. Not unlike Yıldız Palace, which was condemned as the 
“monument of despotism” during the constitutional era, each of these newly confiscated 
palaces and imperial buildings were now denounced as the root cause of “today’s 
distresses and disasters.”96 Yet, the dynastic buildings and things were deemed to embody 
not only the “burdensome past” of the Ottoman Empire but also its imagined grandeur. 
To give but one example, an official proposal opened to deliberation in May 1924 that 
suggested removing all Ottoman coat of arms, imperial seals and symbols from the 
government offices, schools, and hospitals, many of which were placed presumably 
during the reign of Abdulhamid II, was met with nearly as much objection as support at 
the parliament.97 Thus, the republican government had to tread the line between these 
realms of desired and undesired, that is “selective,” pasts with utmost care.98  
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Aided by a rhetoric exemplified in a Resimli Ay article shortly after the abolition 
of the caliphate, the new government defined all dynastic buildings (and objects they 
contained) as “treasure troves of unequaled value,” yet “made of blood of the 
nation/people.”99 In the months that followed, the contemporary press continued to 
exploit this theme at great length, frequently inviting their readers “to take their minds off 
of the poverty and misery that surround[ed] them” by taking virtual tours of Topkapı 
Palace, “where [the miseries of] the people had rarely ever reached before.”100 Even the 
guidebook, written for the actual visitors of Topkapı Palace, which opened its doors to 
general public in October 1924, played on a similar juxtaposition.101 The booklet 
presented the palace to its prospective visitors similarly as a treasure trove which had 
been out of Turks[ish citizens]’ reach for most of its existence (particularly during the 
Hamidian era, the introductory text specified) and served only a small group of privileged 
Ottoman and foreign visitors.102  
Outside of this specific rhetorical function, dynastic property was put to a number 
of different uses by the Republican government, all tainted, in varying degrees, by a 
similar sort of ambivalence. Most obvious of these uses had to do with the palace 
buildings’ and things’ museum content and value. In European context, by the second 
half of the eighteenth century, vast collections of valuable and rare items and spectacular 
buildings that housed them were seen as the manifestation not solely of sovereign’s 
power, but also increasingly of national might and pride, and by the same token, good 
governance.103 Not unlike post-revolutionary France, the Ottoman palace buildings and 
things in the early Republican era carried the potential of becoming “a sign of popular 
sovereignty and triumph” over a “treacherous and parasitic” order, inciting a “communal 
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enjoyment of nationalized property … contribut[ing] to … the ‘republican mold.’”104 As 
Wendy Shaw argued for the Ottoman case, museums, including the newly converted 
palaces, became expressions of a “national idea” and eventually assumed a new level of 
significance during and after the national struggle.105  
What is less obvious perhaps and more easily taken for granted than its 
ideological dimension is the material aspect of this transformation. For, as the Kırşehir 
deputy Yahya Galib asserted, “nationalizing” imperial palaces and buildings was not 
enough to make them  “national” (milli). Only when they were put into reuse in a 
meaningful institutional capacity, for the benefit of the public, they would become so.106 
By that, Yahya Galib did not solely mean the conversion of palaces into national 
museums; he also meant that the dynastic property had to be transformed into schools, 
hospitals, and other public buildings and “things” of the new republic.107 When Yahya 
Galib stressed this point at the parliament, various commissions for inventorying and 
registering dynastic property were already at work towards that end.108 In July 1924, a 
commission was formed to classify things found in “Dolmabahçe, Yıldız, Beylerbeyi” 
palaces, for the specific purpose furnishing the new building of the Grand National 
Assembly in Ankara.109 In an official note, the Ministry of Finance asked the Office of 
the Prime Minister to oversee the administrative and legal procedures for the transaction 
of sixty items chosen for this purpose, a list that comprised not only valuable art pieces 
such as a number of Aivazovsky paintings, but also small, trivial items such as an 
enameled cigarette box and a gilt tobacco stand, a lacquered coat hanger, vases and 
curtains, among other things.110  
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In the following year, reportedly another 335 items were sent to Ankara to be 
used in furnishing the Assembly Building, in addition to many others that were 
distributed to various ministry buildings as well as embassies and consulates abroad.111 
More things were dispensed in the subsequent years, to furnish schools, orphanages, 
government institutions, as well as the newly established “Diplomats’ Club” which aimed 
to host and entertain the foreign representatives resident in Ankara.112 Various 
presidential mansions, particularly the primary residence in Ankara, Çankaya Köşkü, 
itself confiscated from the wealthy Armenian Kasabian family during the Armenian 
genocide a decade earlier, were also furnished, for most part, with things taken from the 
imperial palaces.113  
As dynastic things continued to flow towards Ankara, a specter of the Ottoman 
dynasty began to haunt the Republican administration. For one, all Ottoman coat of arms, 
imperial seals and symbols were ordered to be removed from the government offices, 
schools, and hospitals by a governmental decree in 1925, ostensibly because they were 
incompatible with the “notion of the republic” (cumhuriyet mefhumu).114 That the Law on 
the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu), which came into effect the same year 
to suppress all popular and political opposition, was extended to dynastic symbols and 
images in circulation via print media, indicates that there was more to the removal of 
these symbols than a simple conceptual incompatibility.115 The Republican government 
was aware that destroying, erasing, or tucking away the dynastic signs, symbols, and 
images were laden with new ambiguities and dangers. As one governmental decree made 
it clear, for instance, an all-encompassing erasure process would perpetuate a public 
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debate, which carried an apparent risk of highlighting and bolstering the dynastic claims 
on buildings and things in question.116  
Perhaps it was to counter this imminent claim that, in the ensuing years, the 
Republican government tightly knit its own power and might with the buildings and 
things they had taken over, especially if they were “shiny” enough. To give but one 
example, every year the Ministry of Foreign Affairs borrowed a set of gilt tableware from 
the Directorate of National Palaces (a new institution established to oversee the use and 
maintenance of dynastic property) by the direct orders of Mustafa Kemal, to be used in 
the banquets they were holding for foreign representatives, for the occasion of Republic 
Day that commemorated the proclamation of the republic.117 The palace buildings 
themselves were also put into use for important diplomatic conferences, and official visits 
from foreign royalty were given a royal treatment with the use of imperial buildings and 
things, both in Istanbul and Ankara.118 What is perplexing is that this took place on the 
personal level as well. Upon becoming the chair of Grand National Assembly, Kazım 
Paşa brought with him to Ankara the things given to his use at Dolmabahçe Palace, where 
he spent the previous summer; a list of 57 items that comprised, among other things, a 
confectionary plate, a whisk broom, and a soap dish.119 Unsurprisingly in this context, on 
his first return to Istanbul in 1927, after eight years of absence, Mustafa Kemal 
ceremoniously entered the Dolmabahçe Palace,120 held a banquet in its Grand Ceremonial 
Hall just as the Ottoman sultans did until a few years earlier, and continued to live there 
intermittently until his death a decade later.  
Despite the increased usage and circulation of dynastic buildings and things by 
and for “the people,” the republican administration still was still less than clear as to what 
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it meant in actuality. Accordingly, the question of property as a means to understand 
“who the nation was” and who represented it, once again took central importance. The 
lengthy debates of the constitutional era had now largely given way to short, sharp 
interrogations, but a degree of ambiguity still loomed large in the parliamentary sessions 
on the transfer and ownership of dynastic property. Such was the case with the things 
given to the Grand National Assembly, when the Trabzon deputy Muhtar Bey brought the 
matter to the parliament as a formal question.121 In a concise yet boldly inquisitive 
manner, Muhtar Bey asked the Finance Minister Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey to reveal the 
legal and administrative procedure for the said transfer. Were these items, all of which 
were deemed valuable national property (emlak-ı milliye), given to the Assembly within 
the limits of law and in exchange for their monetary value? “This chandelier [above us],” 
Muhtar Bey exemplified, “did the Ministry of Finance receive a payment for it or make 
budgetary arrangements for its compensation?” Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey tried to explain 
that a procedure for their legal appropriation had begun but has not been brought to a 
conclusion yet. When further pushed for more detailed explanations, he suddenly uttered: 
“I do not see any difference between these items being kept there at the palace or here [in 
this building] … the [actual] goal is to maintain them; here or there, they are maintained 
in our name. This building is ours but so is the palace, it too is ours!”122  
Not entirely clear yet perhaps, but in contrast to the constitutional government’s 
insecure utterances on a vague notion of “the people” a decade and a half earlier, the 
Republican government now appeared surer and more unhindered about its jurisdictional 
limits. More than simply possessing the dynastic buildings and things, it now claimed the 
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authority and power to command how they could and should be put into use, and 
answered, along the way, who the nation was and what it took for it to own “things.” 
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76 Üngör and Polatel, Confiscation and Destruction, 46; for the content of the law, see Düstur, 
Tertib-i Sani, 7. Cilt (Dersaadet: Matbaa-i Amire, 1336), 737–740 (27 September 1915). 
77 “Ahir mahellere nakledilen eşhasın emval ve düyun ve matlubat-ı metrukesi hakkında kanun-ı 
muvakkat,” Düstur, Tertib-i Sani, 7. Cilt , 737–738.  
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